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Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Asia's Super-Exporters: 
Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin America 
Gustav Ranis * 
Yale University 
The process of enhanced differentiation within the developing 
world in the course of the past two decades has been especially marked 
by the emergence of the so-called SIC's or semi-industrialized cotmtries. 
The new prominence of, this fast growing middle tier of countries, along 
with the dramatic rise of OPEC, has been instrumental in transforming 
the landscape within the South, as well as relations between North and 
South. To the naked eye, moreover, it would appear that the members of 
this middle class of developing countries have experienced a rather 
similar pattern of development over the past two decades--characterized 
by high overall growth rates and an especially rapid growth of manufac­
turing, including a rise in manufacturing exports. On closer examination, 
however, we may become convinced that there really are two very distinct 
types of SIC's to consider, one which may in shorthand--and imperfectly-­
be called the Latin American type, the second the East Asian type. 
This distinction focuses on two important and related dimensions 
of performance--one having to do with marked differences in the underlying 
success of their industrial export performance, the other with the internal 
balance between growth and distributional outcomes. Moreover, we shall 
want to examine the causes of the divergence which lie partly in differ­
ences in the endowment conditions and partly in the nature of the policy 
choices made over time in the two sub-sets of countries. 
* Comments by Carlos Diaz Alejandro and Hollis Chenery are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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The East Asian SIC's both pose a challenge and present an opportunity 
to their Latin American counterparts. The challenge is best smnmarized 
by their substantially superior industrial export performance over the 
past two decades which has worried no_t only the developed countries. The 
opportunity is represented by the extent their example happens to be rele­
vant to current Latin American trade and development objectives. Section 
II will be devoted to an analysis of the divergent two SIC cases in his­
torical perspective, with Section III focussing on the options currently 
facing the Latin American economies with particular reference to their 
industrial exports. 
II 
Any effort to "explain" the contrasting export performance of the 
East Asian and Latin American SIC's drives us towards the acceptance of 
the notion that some sort of underlying typological approach to develop­
ment makes sense. This means that we believe in the existence of a 
family affinity among some of the Latin American SIC's, e.g. Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, just as there exists a family affinity 
among some of the East Asian SIC's, e.g. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. It clearly does not mean that we believe important, and con­
ceptually instructive, differences don't exist within any one sub-family 
of LDC's; Latin Americans, in particular, will rightly bridle at the 
notion of "the" Latin American case~ Rather, it means that intra­
typology variances in either endowment or behavior may be less marked 
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than across typologies, and that this methodological approach, while 
admittedly somewhat casual, may nevertheless be analytically useful. 
Developing countries' attempted transitions to modern growth are 
necessarily circl.nilscribed by their initial conditions, including their 
colonial heritage,and other economic-geographic factors such as resource 
endowment, location etc. The historical experience we have been able 
to analyze to date, moreover, permits us to formulate an "evolutionary" 
view of development, i.e. one based on the identification of subphases 
of transition characterized by somewhat differing structures and chang­
ing modes of operation among the three main sectors, agriculture, non­
agriculture and foreign. Such phases, of course, represent a combination 
of economic progressions and changing policy packages, with a good deal 
of filling and backing and lots of "gray areas." In discussing movements 
between one phase and the next we are, moreover, talking about gradual 
changes in the way the system is driven rather than anything either 
abrupt or complete. Nor, we want to emphasize, is there anything in­
evitable about any particular sequence of phases. We will, however, 
find it useful to contrast the actual Latin American and East Asian SIC 
experience from this longitudinal vantage point. The interplay between 
the forces of a dynamically changing endowment picture and theinter­
vention of policies to either accommodate or mute these forces is, of 
course, an essential element in analyzing these contrasts in phasing 
and performance. 
The family affinity among the Latin American SIC's can be swmnarized 
in terms of their joint Iberian colonial heritage, a relatively early 
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start for their post- colonial transition growth effort, their fairly 
large size (on the average) and their endowment which is relatively natural 
resources rich but characterized generally by remaining pockets of a 
not very literate unskilled labor surplus on the land. At the beginning 
of serious post-colonial transition growth efforts--whether, these are 
dated more appropriately in the 1880's or the 1930's--we are left with 
the heritage of a colonial period which focused heavily on traditional 
primary export activities within a pre-assigned scheme of the interna~ 
tional division of labor. 
In contrast, the East Asian SIC's are relatively smaller-sized and 
located in a population dense and natural resources poor region, with 
favorable levels of literacy for a large labor surplus population and 
a colonial experience which varied between British entrepot interests 
in the perhaps less generally interesting city states of Hong Kong and 
Singapore and heavy Japanese attention to the rural sector and the ex­
traction of food crops in the more relevant cases of Korea and Taiwan. 
The two contrasting colonial or pre-transition phases may be pictured· 
in panel I of diagram A· Under colonialism both the Latin American and the 
East Asian NIC's' agricultural sector A produces the domestic food sup­
ply (Df) for the households H plus exportable goods (Xa) which help 
"finance" the import of non-durable consumer goods (M ) flowing from 
en 
the foreign sector F. Given the relative larger size of the typical 
Latin American case more domestic industries supplying a portion of the 
domestic market for, say, textiles, undoubtedly existed, but large por­
tions of the domestic market for these goods were satisfied via imports 
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DIAGRAM A 
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in both cases. Another important difference, not captured by the diagram, 
resides in the commodity content of the primary export, consisting gen­
erally of minerals and raw materials requiring very specific kinds of 
large-scale infrastructural investments (ports, railways) in the case of 
Latin America, and of rice and sugar, requiring generally small-scale 
as well as organizationalinfrastructural investments (irrigation, roads), 
land reform and the creation of farmers' associations)innovations, (e.g. 
in the case of East Asia. 
Both the East Asian and Latin American SIC's--as virtually all other 
LDC's--initiated their tr~nsition effort by moving into primary import 
substitution (PIS) during-their respective post-independence periods. 
According to this pattern, captured in diagram A. panel II, an increasing 
portion of the primary product earnings (X) is diverted from the impor-a 
tation of non-durable consumer goods (M ) and toward the importation of en 
producer goods (M)p 
which permit the emergence and growth of so-called 
primary import substitution industries inthe non-agricultural sector 
NA which is now able to produce these textiles (D ) to gradually sub­en 
stitute for the previously imported variety (M ) in the domestic market. en 
It is this sub-phase of growth, fuelled by primary product exports (and, 
of course, supplemented by foreign capital imports) that entails several 
statistically observable substitution phenomena, including the gradual 
reduction of consumer goods imports, relative to producer goods imports. 
Panels Ila and Ilb are again virtually equivalent, with one significant 
be need for some rtet imports of food (Mf),evenexception, i.e. there may 
1 
at this stage,in s:>me of the Latin American SIC's. 
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The overall performance of the two systems during the PIS sub-phase 
is not so very different on the surface (see the Country Statistical 
Indicator Tables). Per capita income growth rates (row 1) were modest, 
if respectable,with the relative reallocation of the labor force to 
non-agriculture e (row 2) proceeding rapidly in both cases. The econo­
mies, even the smaller ones of East Asia, remain basically inward­
oriented, as the often-recited interventionist package of protectionist 
industrial and foreign exchange policies trend the system toward autarky. 
Saving rates (row 3) are modest, investment rates (row 4) substantial, 
and distributional indicators,where available,(rows 5 and 6), heavily 
influenced by relatively low rates of employment generation, everywhere 
generally unsatisfactory. 
On fuller examination, however, we may note the existence of under­
lying differences even during this sub-phase which yield their reper­
cussions on performance later on. One has to do with the relatively 
better performance of agricultural productivity in the East Asian case, 
as a consequence of the combination of their better colonial "preparation" 
and a lesser relative neglect during the primary import substitution phase 
itself. A second, related,point is that the level of effective protec­
tion was generally lower in the East Asian than in the Latin American 
case, making its contribution to a somewhat lower temperature in the 
industrial hot-house. This is important in assessing the more recent 
experience of these two types of SIC's. As traditional land-based entre­
preneurs are converted into industrial entrepreneurs,the level of 
protection and of profit transfer needs to be high enough for infant 
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industry reasons but not so high or persistent as to discourage entre­
preneurial maturation. 
,As is well known, this process of primary import substitution (PIS) 
growth must inevitably terminate once all non-durable consumer goods 
imports (M ) have been substituted for by domestic output (D ); further 
en en 
industrialization of this type,directed to the domestic market,then has 
to slow to the pace of population plus per capita income growth. Another 
indicator of the exhaustion of PIS is the decline of the M /M ratio en 
which, as Table 1 indicates, reaches a low level plateau in most cases 
by the early 60's. Larger countries as represented by the Latin American 
SIC's may take a longer time to reach domestic market :saturation in this 
sense-- witness the fact that Latin America took at least twenty years 
(1930-1950) to arrive at this point (possibly much longer, 1880-1950) 
while the East Asian SIC's took approximately a decade, 1953-1963. 
The societal decisions reached to avoid a cul de sac at this point 
in the transition growth effort may be the most important in explaining 
the more recent divergence in the performance of our two types of SIC's. 
Once fIS came to its inevitable end, the East Asian SIC's moved into 
primary export substitution as their second transition phase, while their 
Latin American counterparts continued with import substitution but now 
of the secondary (or capital and consumer durable goods) type (see 
panel III of diagram A). 
In the East Asian case (panel Illa) we now encounter the new phenomenon 
of primary export substitution (PES) i.e. the export of the same non­
durable consumer goods into world markets. Such penetration is facili­
tated by the increased ability of the now more experienced industrial 
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Table 1 




1950 1962 1970 1977 
· Brazil 4.1(53) 2.52 3.43 2.17 
C.Olombia 12 .8 (51) 5.37 5.08 6.08(75) 
Argentina 14.4 5.21 6.28 3.71(76) 
Mexico 5.8 4.30 5.67 4.56(74) 
Chile 4 .4 (52) 4.37 4 .53 (71) 2. 32 (74) 
Korea 8.0 7.4 5.0 
Taiwan 17.2(53)* 8.1 (60)* 5.8 2.9 




892 printed matter 
64 paper, paperboard, etc. 
Sources: U.N. C.Ommodity Trade Statistics Statistical Papers, Series D. 
Taiwan 1977 -- Monthly Trade Figures, Taiwan Stat. Office. 
U.N. Yrbk. of Internat. Trade Statis. 1950. 
* Computation not comffeletely comparable to others due to lack 
of SITC data. 
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entrepreneurs to combine with the abundance of unskilled labor while 
taking advantage of accommodating changes in the overall economic policy 
package in the direction of lower protection and increased liberalization 
in various markets. The emergence of a new type of unskilled labor 
based export (X ), graduallY, replacing the traditional primary producten ,. 
export (X ),is due to both negative and positive factors. Negatively,a 
the basic limitation of natural resources--quite aside from the rtmning 
out of domestic markets for non-durable constm1er goods--will force a 
change in the structure and operation of the system. Positively, the 
gradual building up of the system's htm1an resources provides the ingre­
dients for the establishment of efficiency-oriented industries which 
send labor-embodying manufactured goods to world, especially developed 
country, markets. 
The sustained march of primary export substitution in the East 
Asian SIC' s of Korea and Taiwan during the 1960 and early 1970' s can be 
captured by the rapidly rising proportion of total exports which are 
manufactured (see Indicators, row 9). Moreover, the rapidly rising 
overall growth of exports an.d participation of these systems in the 
world economy is documented by the growth of total exports (row 10) 
and of the external orientation ratio X/GNP (row 11), which has reached 
perhaps the highest levels in the world (50%) in Korea and Taiwan. 
It is this rapid increase in industrial exports which has earned 
the East Asian SIC's the title of super-exporter and which has drawn 
the attention of both the DC's and the Latin .American SIC's. It is 
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based, of course, on what constitutes a remarkable domestic development 
perfonnance which has drawn less attention--namely the ability of the 
export-oriented industrial sector to quickly absorb its unemployed and 
underemployed labor at fairly stable real wages. The pursuit of such 
an employment sensitive growth path, aided by a strategy of small-scale, 
rural-oriented industrialization and even faster (than earlier) agricul­
tural productivity change yielded not only extremely rapid rates of per 
capita income increase but also the achievement of good and improving 
income distribution performance--even before all the labor surplus 
2 . 
was mopped up by the early 70's. Once the Asian SIC's' labor surpluses 
had run outi first in ~aiwan, then in Korea, real wages began to rise 
and the comparative advantage in labor intensive manufactured goods 
gradually to disappear. 
As a consequence, the East Asian countries' industrial output mix 
shifted towards more skilled labor, technology and capital intensive 
goods, both for the domestic and then the export markets. This so-called 
secondary import cum secondary export substitution phase (see panel !Va 
of diagram.A) reinforces elements already present in the earlier sub­
phases,i.e. moving along the product cycle in continuing response to 
gradual changes in the endowment. Capital goods.and consumer durables etc. 
are now produced for the home market (Dcd) and exported (Xcd). A re­
lated phenomenon is the more or less complete atrophy over time of the 
domestic agricultural sector, an activity in which the East Asian SIC's 
do not have a long run comparative advantage. As a consequence we may 
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note that food imports (Mf) became necessary from the beginning in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, quite early in Korea (which did less well with its 
own rural sector) and are about to prospectively in Taiwan. The inter­
national market responsiveness of the East Asian SIC's during this 
period is best demonstrated by their ability to overcome formal and 
informal quota arrangements in the advanced countries, international 
recession, inflation and even the post-1973 OPEC crisis. This is not 
to say that the current crisis in the world economy is leaving the 
East Asian SIC's entirely unscathed--witness the large foreign debt 
of Korea, for example--but that an amazing record of growth and export 
performance has been compiled over the past two decades in spite of all this. 
In the case of the Latin American SIC's, in contrast, once primary 
import substitution industrialization ended, arouni 1950, the system 
moved directly into a secondary import substitution (SIS) phase (see 
panel IIIb). This meant the establishment, at home, of more skilled 
labor, capital and technology intensive industries capable of producing 
previo~sly imported capital goods and consumer durables and processing 
raw materials previously processed abroad (Dcd). It also meant a con­
tinuation of development "hacia adentro", including the maintenance, 
if not intensification and broadening--now to include capital goodsetc.-­
of the protectionist and controls-oriented policy structure of the 
previous phase. Table 2 indicates the comparative level of effective 
protection in the mid-60's for a representative of each of our SIC 
families as well as for the Philippines (about which more later). The 
extent of protection on non-durable consumer goods is negative in Korea 





SOUTH KOREA BRAZIL PHILIPPINES 
1967 1965 
Corde n Balassa Corden Balassa Corden 
Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure 
17.9 10 10 0 0 
-14.2 5.5 40 47 46 
15 15-15.5 334 155 
14 13 -25 -253.5 
-8.8 47 29 so 50 
-18.8 16 16 
88 85 
53-8.0 49 67 55 
70 101 1355 106239.8 
112 10.329.5 57 75 
7583.5 47 60 






































Source: S. Korea--Charles R. 
Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1975). 
Brazil and Philippines--Bela Balassa et al., The Structure of Protection 
in Developing Countries, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). 
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and capital goods, on the other hand, we note much higher effective pro­
tection rates in the case of both Brazil and the Philippines. Moving 
directly into SIS regimes thus meant none of the major shifts in the 
direction of exchange rate and other··market liberalizations which the 
East-Asian SIC's had undertaken in the early 60's. 
Another, and closely related, distinguishing feature of the Latin 
.American case is, of course, their continued relative abtmdance of natural 
resources, which permits the continued exportation of traditional raw 
materi_als and/or the supplementation of traditional by new ones (X ) • a 
Unlike the East Asian case where import substitution, of whatever kind, 
is necessarily somewhat short lived, in Latin America it can continue 
to be fuelled even as it becomes more and more "expensive" in terms of 
possibly increasing deviations from socially optimal industrial output 
mixes and technologies. 
By the late 1960's and early 1970 1 s secondary import substitution 
in Latin America had generally been modified to include export promotion 
we define as the selective encouragement of particular industries or 
even firms by administrative action in order to "push out" exports in 
the absence of a general change in the structure of protection, or market 
liberalization. Export promotion requires subsidization either via 
public sector fiscal transfers, interest rate differentials, tariff rebates, 
etc. or alternatively,via private sector subsidization or price discrim­
ination induced or cajoled by assuring the same companies a continuation 
of high windfall profits in protected domestic markets. The increase 
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in industrial export orientation here is caused not by a product cycle 
type of evolution resulting from increased entrepreneurial maturation 
responding to changing resource endowment and accompanied by acconnno­
dating changes in general economic policy. Instead, it is the consequence 
of additional controls and incentives planted "on top of" the existing 
import substitution superstructure. Domestic cont~nt and export targets 
are imposed,as the overall protective veils on intermediate inputs and 
on relative prices governing primary inputs are left intact. As indus­
trial exports have become increasingly recognized as a "good thing"-­
even by Prebish and his ECLA followers--commodities up the technology 
and capital intensity ladder have moved into domestic production (Dcd) 
and exports, (Xcd),most often sequentially, sometimes simultaneously. 
Automobile assembly is a case in point as increasing domestic component 
requirements are linked with increased export quotas. 
The Latin American SIC development path is clearly much less over­
all export-oriented (see XJGNP in Country Statistical Indicators, row 11), 
and with a lower proportion of manufactured exports than the East 
Asian cases. Note that the proportion of the population in non-agriculture 
e (see row 2) is not all that different across our two types of SIC's 
by the mid-7O's,the end of the period; but notice also that the rate of 
increase in 0 over the past 20 years has been much more pronounced in 
the East Asian cases--in spite of the relatively higher population 
growth rates during that period in Latin America. 
The relative neglect of food producing agriculture seems to have 
continued, perhaps even been exacerbated,during the SIS/EP phase. As 
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Table 2 indicates, the representative East Asian SIC's start with somewhat 
higher cereal yields than the Latin American SIC's in 1950 (with other, 
natural resource rich,Asian LDC's somewhat intermediate); but what is 
most impressive is the divergence in·.yield growth rates thereafter. Net 
food imports (Mf) have become an increasingly important factor in these 
relatively natural resource rich Latin American SIC's (e.g. Mexico), over 
time. Export cash crops which are generally likely to be less labor 
intensive than domestic food crops are favored by a research and relative 
price intervention system geared to the need to continue channeling these 
export proceeds into import substituting industries. Unskilled industrial 
real wages are, moreover, likely to increase more in these cases (see Table 4), 
partly as a consequence of the relative rise in the prices of agricultural 
wage goods and partly as a result of enhanced unionization and minimum 
wage legislation accompanying prolonged import substitution. As we men­
tioned earlier, Latin American growth and savings rates are generally 
respectable, if lower than in the East Asian caseS (see rows 1 and 3). 
There is, however, a striking discrepancy in the equity indicators, 
(rows 5 -and 6), resulting from the combination of less attention to food 
producing agriculture and labor.intensive industries serving international 
markets. 
In summary, what looks superficially like a paler, Latin American 
version of the same East Asian success story (see Table 5a) is actually 
quite different. As we can see from Table Sb, the canposition of industrial 
exports was consistently biased against non-durable consumer goods in 
the Latin American cases,with the exception of Colombia. Only in the 
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TABLE 3 
INDICES OF MAJOR CEREAL CROP YIELDS* 
(Annual Growth in Parentheses) 
1948-1952 1952-1956 1961 1965 1970 1975 1977 
(Mexico 1950 = 100) 
TAIWAN 309 375 427 531 532 529 571 
(5 .O) (2.2) (5. 6) (O.O) (-0.1) (3. 9) 
SOUTH KOREA 483 445 553 513 617 710 904 
(-2.0) (3.7) (-1.8) (4. 7) (2. 8) (12.8) 
BRAZIL 168 159 175 184 182 208 218 
(-5. 3) (1.6) (1. 3) (-0.3) (2. 7) (2. 4) 
MEXICO 100 108 132 149 162 169 162 
(3.1) (2 .1) (0.8) (-2.1)(1.9) (3.4) 
MALAYSIA 220 235 294 294 323 355 361 
(1. 7) (3.8) (O.O) (2. 3) (1.9) (O. 8) 
221 261PHILIPPINES 157 160 164 175 229 
(0.4) (0.4) (1.6) (6.0) (0,7) (6. 8) 
(1950 yield= 100) 
TAIWAN 100 121 138 172 172 171 185 
SOUTH KOREA 100 92 115 106 128 147 187 
130BRAZIL 100 94 104 110 108 124 
~ £"I , .::o 
.1.UL .LV7 162MEXICO 100 108 132 149 
MALAYSIA 100 107 134 134 147 161 164 
PHILIPPINES 100 102 104 111 140 146 166 
Sources: All figures are from FAO Production Yearbooks, 1966, 1970 and 1977, except 
Taiwan 1975-77 which are estimates based on multiplying 1970 yield by an 
index of rice yields from Republic of China, Statistical Yearbook, 1978. 
For Brazil and*Figures are the cereal crop to which the most acreage is devoted. 




Real Monthly Wages in Construction 
(In constant 1970 U.S. $) 
i, 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
South Korea 81.0 77 .2 46.6 73.2 89.7 85.5 95.5 155.0 189.1 
Index 
(1955=100) 100.0 95.3 57.5 90.9 110.7 105.6 118.4 191.4 233.5 
Mexico 51.5 62.6 64.7 84.9 98.4 109.3 104.4 
Index 
(1955=100) 100.0 121.6 125.6 164.9 191.1 212.2 202.7 
Source: "Wage Tables for Latin America and the Carribbean Countries," Swadesh Bose, un­
published World Bank Development EconomicsDepartment rnimeo, 1979. 
TABLE 5 
THE GROWTH AND COMPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS 
Sa Sb 
( Exeorts of Consumer Non-durables) 
Annual Growth Rates (%) Total Industrial Exports % 
Total Manufacturing Consumer Non-durable 
Exports Exports 
1962-70 1970-77 1962-70 1970-77 1962 1970 1977 
Brazil 28.6% 40.5 41.4 44.7 11.3 24.2 29.8 
Chile 13.0 33 ••~ 18.0 29.7 23.3 34.3 31.5 
(62-71) (71-74) (62-71) (71-74) 
Colombia 20.5 38.0 17.8 39.6 48.3 39 . .Z 42.6 I-' 
I 
00 
(75) (75) I 
Argentina 24.9 25.6 45.5 22.8 8.8 29.8 26.0 
(76) (76) 
Mexico 11.8 31.2 5.8 33.9 30.7 20.3 21.4I 
(74) (74) 
Korea 67.0 44.7 75.7 39.5 33.1 49.5 38.3 
Taiwan 34.7 32.8 32.6 30.7 46.7 41.2 36.9 
Source: Computed from U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics, Statistical Papers, Series D. 
For Taiwan 1977 Monthly Trade Figures, Taiwan Statistic"!-! Office.111 
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70's did Korea and Taiwan begin to shift markedly towards more capital 
intensive industrial exports. Even when similar SITC categories of goods 
are being produced in and exported from both sets of SIC's the competi­
tiveness at international prices nndoubtedly varies markedly, with 
Latin American intermediate inputs, for example, having to be procured 
domestically, and with primary factor markets considerably more dis­
torted. It is striking, for example, (see Ta~le 6) that both with respect 
to the export of all manufactured goods and the export of non-durable 
consmner goods, there is a tendency for the Latin American SIC's to 
sell a larger and--even more meaningfully--increasing proportion of the 
total to other LDC~s. Sales within the Andean Pact countries, for example, 
are more like sales in a protected domestic market. Quite the opposite 
trend is in evidence for the East Asian SIC's who are generally increas­
ing their already high sales to the developed countries, especially in 
the case of the non-durables where their comparative advantage has been 
presumably highest, at least nntil 1970• As international trade theory 
would lead us to expect; a larger proportion of the more labor intensive 
exports in the East Asian cases have been destined for the more advanced 
conntry markets. 
In Latin Americ~ food production and rural industry continue to 
languish, relative to potential; substantial pockets of unemployment and 
underemployment persist, as do poverty and worsening levels of income 
distribution inequality. The question which inevitably arises, from 
the point of view of Latin American policy-makers, is the proximate 
cause, in nature and in man, of the particular path these economies 
have taken, and to what extent it is or should be reversible. We intend 
to, finally, turn our attention to these issues. 
Table 6 

















Des LDCs DCs LDCs DCs LDCs I DCs LDCs DCs LDCs DCs LDCs 
Brazil 63.2 36.6 54.7 43.4 55.7 43.1 75.7 20.6 78.3 16.4 74.7 19.2 
Colombia 50.5 49.4 42.4 57.0 42.9 56.6 47.9 51.8 60.2 38.1 70.7 28.4 




Mexico 78.3 21.6 76.0 23.5 73.8 25.6 68.8 31.0 72.0 28.0 87.4 10.1 
Chile 41.7 57.4 33.4 66.8 24.5 71.3 - 99.9 1.1 97.9 - 99.6 
Hong Kong 83.3 15.6 84.0 15.9 82.2 17 .o 75.8 24.0 84.3 15.4 84.4 14.1 
Singapore 3.4 96.5 27.4 72 .1 50.3 48.6 2.2 97.6 27.4 71.3 49.6 47.7 
Korea 83.3 15.6 87.3 12.7 73.3 26.6 98.4 - 85.5 14.4 78.9 20.8 
Taiwan 42.0 58.0 68.7 31.3 n.a. n. a. 42 .8 ·, 56.7 68.1 31. 9 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Same as in Table 5. * Non-market economies not included. 
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III 
Our prior analysis and the necessarily circumstantial evidence 
presented indicate that the Latin American SIC' s "skipped" the labor 
intensive primary export substitution phase and were, as a consequence, 
unable to effectively mobilize their cheap unskilled labor en route to 
economic maturity. It was their relatively abundant land-based exports 
which permitted them to move directly into the production and export 
of more sophisticated industrial products. It also permitted them the 
relative luxury of not fully mobilizing domestic food producing agri­
culture and, if necessary, importing food instead. 
The underlying relative abundance of natural resources--supplemented, 
it should be noted, by foreign capital inflows (both of the equity and 
portfolio variety) makes its impact felt in two related ways. One, by 
rendering the system's underlying exchange rate "strong", it effectively 
discourages labor intensive exports, ceteris paribus, from being competi­
tive; in its extreme form this is the so-called Kuwait Effect, in the 
case of the oil exporting countries. Secondly, there is the related 
opiate or cushion effect of ample export proceeds which makes it possible 
for the system to politically "afford" continued heavy protectionism 
into more and more"expensive" or capital-intensive areasancLmoving 
in which it doesn't necessarily have a comparative advantage--at least 
not yet. 
The availability of ample natural resources and/or foreign capital 
can thus be viewed as permitting the system to continue on its old tracks, 
-22-
thus avoiding the political and, at least short term, economic pain of 
having to move to a different policy package. Growth rates can in this 
way be maintained--just by adding more fuel to the engine--and difficult 
decisions postponed. The contrast with the East Asian cases which, at 
the end of their PIS phase, could not afford to pay for a prolongation 
of import substitution, but were forced by necessity to turn to the 
While additional re­utilization of their human resources, is clear. 
the actual and psychologicalsources, in theory, should be able to ease 
adjustment pains,they can, and in the real world are, often used to 
put off--or entirely avoid--difficult decisions. 
In the Latin American SIC cases, in other words, many decades of 
import substitution growth have led to encrusted habits and strong 
vested interest groups able to resist reforms or even marginal policy 
change. The relatively strong natural resources base permitted the 
society to channel its "windfall" returns both to the workers and the 
entrepreneurs in the protected industrial enclave. Under such condi­
tions of bilateral oligopoly real industrial wages could be raised, 
even in the presence of substantial unemployment and the absence of 
sustained agricultural productivity increase~ by means of government 
supported union pressure and/or minimum wage legislation (see Table 4 
for the contrast in wage behavior). Long before substantial pockets 
of unemployment and underemployment have been eliminated by labor 
absorption and growth, higher wages thus encourage the substantial 
"skipping" of the labor intensive export phase. Higher than normal 
entrepreneurial returns and higher than normal wages for elite workers 
result. To the extent sectoral clashes on distribution occur, these 
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may result in inflation, but the availability of ample land-based exports 
and/or foreign capital are bound to cushion such clashes and permit the 
system to continue on its path. 
With some zigs and zags, this has been the general Latin American 
SIC experience. The only events likely to bring it to an end are either 
the ultimate running out of a sufficiently large natural resources base, 
e.g. Brazil in the face of rising oil import requirements, or Mexico (a 
couple of years ago) having difficulty in attracting the customary volume 
of commercial capital flows; or, on the other hand, the population's 
unwillingness to permit the continued non-participation of substantial 
portions of economic actors and the resulting inequities in the distri­
bution of income. The most recent economic policy changes in Brazil 
may represent a mixture of both these pressures coming to the fore and 
forcing a reassessment of policies. 
Whether a strong desire really exists, beyond the rhetorical level, 
to respond to employment and distributional problems in the typical Latin 
American SIC is a subject of some controversy which I am ill equipped to 
deal with. However, the extent to which the Latin American SIC's have, 
in fact, lost opportunities, and the extent to which such losses are 
reversible inevitably represent relevant issues of importance to policy­
makers and need to be addressed. 
One way of establishing an upper bound estimate of ''what might have 
been" had the Latin American SIC's not decided to skip the PES phase, 
is to estimate the value of manufactured exports for each had it maintained 
its base year, say 1960, market share. In that base year, the beginning 
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of the rapid PES subphase in Asia, the two Asian SIC's had 0.19% of the 
world market in industrial exports, compared to 1.2% of our Latin Ameri­
can counterparts. By 1975, however (see Table 7) the global market share 
of the East Asians had increased eight times while that of the Latin 
Americans had remained about constant. Looking at individual countries, 
we may note that both Taiwan and Korea vastly expanded their market share, 
while those of Chile, Mexico and Colombia declined, with only Brazil as 
an outstanding exception. It is, moreover, important to note that even 
in the LDC market in which they are relatively favored, the Latin American 
SIC's have been losing market shares. 
Even in the most difficult, post-1973,years we should point ou4 
the East Asian SIC's have been able to maintain--or better, restore-­
healthy industrial export growth rates from an already high base, in 
spite of the combination of energy price rises, global inflation, 
recession and increased DC protectionism, which has been devastating 
for non-oil LDC's generally. The growth rate of DC manufactured imports 
from LDC's, for example, fell from 2J.3% in 73-74 to .3% in 74-75 but 
recovered to 39.8% by 75-76. Similarly, Korean manufactured exports 
rate of growth dropped to 9.5% in 74-75 from 39% in 73-74 but recovered 
to 63% by 75-76. 
In spite of the increased DC protectionist response which has 
accompanied the super exporters' success in recent years, it should be 
noted, of course, that LDC manufactured exports still constitute only 
a tiny, if growing,fraction of global industrial exports; in 1955, for 
example, the developed market economies bought only 4% of their imported 
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TABLE 7 
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS--MARKET SHARES 
Share of World Exports Share of LDC Total Exports 
1960 1970 1975 1960 1970 1975 
2 East Asian SIC's 0.19 0.57 1.59 3.44 10. 37 22.87 
1.23 1.07. - 1.26 22.24 16.31 18.115 Latin American SIC's 
South Korea .01 .32 .80 .18 4.88 11.51 
Taiwan .18 .36 .79 3.26 5 .49 11.36 
.OS .18 .43 .90 2.74 6.18Brazil 
.19 1.45 1.83 2.73Argentina .08 .12 
.33 .24 .21 5.97 3.66 3.02Mexico 
.65 .so .37 11.75 7.62 5. 32Chile 
, ') n-:iColombia ....... oVJ .06 2.17 0.49 0. 86 
Source: UN, Yearbook of International Trade for country statistics UNCTAD, 
Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics for world 
and total developing country statistics, except Taiwan, 1975, Monthly 
Trade Figures, Taiwan Statistical Office. 
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had almostmanufactures from LDC's; by 1976 this proportion, however, 
doubled, to 7.8%. The annual growth rates, even in the comparatively 
"difficult" 70-76 period, were 29% for DC purchases from LDC's vs. 
18% from the DC's. Similarly, there·has been substantial growth, if 
from a low base, in intra-LDC manufactured trade, with LDC imports 
from other LDC' s growing by a 27% annual average during 7_0-76 vs. 26% 
for such imports from DC's. The continued contrast in the growth rate 
of manufactured exports between our specific two sets of countries, in 
spite of the large difference in the initial base already established 
by the time of the first OPEC crisis, is vividly demonstrated in the 
empirical record. 
The really important question is, of course, to what extent 
Latin Americans should consider the divergent East Asian experience as 
"natural" consequence of different endowment conditions, and to whata 
extent of different policy choices which might be reversible. As 
with most important questions, this one is rather difficult to answer 
definitively. What we can and will do, instead, is once again appeal 
to comparative historical analysis to shed some light on the question. 
Societies in some sense act like individuals and are likely to 
take the road of lesser resistance if they can "get away with it." 
Thus, the relative natural resources abundance of Colombia, Mexico 
and Brazil clearly biased their transition growth phasing towards the 
have outlined it. More natural resourcesLatin American type as we 
and/or more foreign capital inflows can clearly be used to help ease 
the transition from one policy regime to another, but, just as easily, 
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they can be used to avoid what for some interest groups represent unpleasant 
changes, e.g. the need to seek earned profits in manufactured exports as 
a replacement of windfall profits in manufacturing for domestic markets. 
In an odd Toynbeeian sense the problem of the East Asian SIC's was indeed 
easier. There were no real alternatives; the agricultural sector could 
be viewed as a temporary, if important, source of fuel, but the system's 
long run comparative advantage had to be sought for elsewhere, i.e. in 
the system's human resources, first unskilled, then skilled. 
To some extent. elearly, the "skipping" of the primary export substi­
tution phase in Latin America was thus a politically convenient decision 
rather than the simple consequence of resources andexchange rates. Pro­
tectionist devices were generally maintained and reinforced; agricultural 
productivity neglected;real wage rates raised; and selective industrial 
export subsidies administered. But many of these policies can also be 
reversed and currently existing substantial pockets of unskilled surplus 
labor productively absorbed. The dubious benefit arising from temporary 
natural resource bonanzas can be controlled by running asurplus and 
trying to sterilize the inflows,as Chile( and the U.K.) is now attempting 
to do. Minimum wages--and the power of unions--can be permitted to lag 
in real terms. And rural sectors can be given some real attention 
for the first time, both in terms of a shift to amaller scale infra­
structural investments and better internal terms of trade. Given the 
relatively larger size of the Latin American SIC's, larger attention to 
domestic balanced growth .as part of the strategy is probably indicated. 
Most of al~ a reversal of development strategies requires a redress of 
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the neglect of food producing agriculture as is currently under way in 
both South Korea and some of the Latin American SIC's, particularly 
Brazil (see Table 3). 
Real world economies~ of course; move in ambiguous non-monotonic 
paths, lurching forward in one direction one year, partially retracing 
their steps the next. Moreover, as we have pointed out earlier, they 
are too complicated to be packaged into neat typologies or transition 
phases. In fact, it is that very grayness and ambiguity which also 
supports the positive argument for sustantial residual flexibility within 
any given system at any given point in time. 
This point is perhaps best demonstrated by pointing out that Korea 
and Brazil have been deviating sufficiently from their own "families" 
in recent years to have several elements in common. There can be little 
doubt that there have been substantial elements of export promotion 
along with export substitution in the Korean situation, especially since 
1998--witness the setting of firm export targets combined with substantial 
arm twisting or implied threats concerning the withdrawal of other favors. 
'-
Korea's relative early neglect of agriculture (with respect to its own 
reference group, see Table 3) combined with a rapid primary export sub­
onstitution drive in the 60's meant foreign capital had to be relied 
much more heavily than, say, in Taiwan, both to help finance food imports 
and in. dustria1 . 
3 Brazil's performance, par-rapi"d . expansion. Similarly, 
ticularly between 1963 and 1973--and perhaps again currently--contains 
substantial elements of export substitution, yielding a burst in shoe 
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and textile production and exports. While it is too early to tell, 
indications are, moreover, that Brazil may be seriously concerned with 
mobilizing the domestic balanced growth blade of such a strategy with 
the required help of a spurt in the hitherto neglected food producing 
agricultural sector. 
Other support for the potential reversibility of the Latin American 
transition pattern may be offered by looking very briefly at a third 
group of countries, the potential future SIC's of Asia, i.e. Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. These countries have natural resource 
endowments and other characteristics which place them somewhere between 
the East Asian and Latin American SIC's. Their performance with respect 
to growth and equity (see Country Indicator Tables) has quite 
similarly been somewhat "intermediate", best for Malaysia, followed by 
Indonesia and perhaps worst for the Philippines. With respect to phasing, 
they have essentially been following a Latin American SIC transition 
growth sequence, moving from a colonial pattern after World War II, to 
primary import substitution in the SO's and to secondary import substitu­
tion in at least the Philippines since then. As the East Asian SIC's 
successfully mopped up their surplus labor and as their wages rose, they 
moved,one by one, into secondary import substitution/export substitution 
during the late 60's and early 70's; there are clear signs, moreover, 
that the other Asian countries, Malaysia in particular, are currently 
making an effort to step into the labor intensive export niche being 
vacated. Indonesia still seems to be doing somewhat less well in avoiding 
a Kuwait Effect coupled with adverse policy changes; and the Philippines, 
while it has the potential, is not as yet seriously in the running. 
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Just to sharpen the visual contrast between our three sets of cou
ntries , 
we have plotted in diagram:; 1 to 6 the per capita income growth, 
equity, 
industrial export and agricultural performance indices of two rep
resenta­
tives for each of our groups. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philip
pines seem 
to constitute intermediate observations between the Latin Americ
an and East 
Asian SIC's in each of the dimensions of performance which we hav
e found 
to be relevant. This certainly adds to the circumstantial eviden
ce we 
It also tends to support the suggestion thathave been accmnulating. 
other Asian LDC's, would-be SIC's, are'standing in the wing~' read
y to 
exercise their flexibility in terms of policy reversal and redire
ction 
along the lines indicated here. Here is part of the challenge an
d the 
opportunity. Within contemporary Latin America, Brazil and perha
ps 
Chile as well, plus Colombia between 1967 and 1973~ represent pa
st 
examples of efforts to enter the particular international produc
tion 
Main­
and trade niche currently being vacated by the East Asian SIC's. 
land China and India, of course, constitute other potential comp
etitors 
for that role, but still somewhat down the road. 
As Latin American policy makers ponder both the challenge and the
 
opportnnity arising from the East Asian historical example they m
ay well-­
and in fact frequently have--cite the "specialness" of these cas
es, either 
in terms of favored access to capital and markets or a more favo
rable 
international environment generally in the 60's as compared to th
e BO's. 
Yet one must also add to the record of, say, Taiwan that she had
 to 
overcome substantial disadvantages,including not only the poverty
 of 
natural resources,but also two major economic/political upheaval
s followed 
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by the continuous drain of high defense expenditures, and increasingly 
severe protectionist restrictions by the U.S. and Europe, accompanying 
her success in export substitution growth. 
The niche in world trade labelled "labor intensive manufactured 
goods" is, of course, not limited in size but expandable in terms of 
both variations in quality characteristics and markets, including 
among· the developing cotmtries themselves. In the final analysis, 
the question of whether Latin American SIC's will be persuaded that 
a change in the direction of policy is both feasible and desirable 
depends as much on the capacity for political reform mongering as on 
the technical issues raised. But it is certainly necessary, if not 
sufficient, for such policy makers to be convinced that "moving back" 
towards a more agriculture and labor intensive industry oriented 
growth path is likely to enhance growth along with equity objectives 
more dependably than grafting export promotion policies onto a heavily 
encrusted import substitution base. 
Notes 
1. To keep matters simple, we are retaining the three sector breakdown. 
Differentiating diagramatically between food and non-food agriculture would 
help but also complicate things i.mduly. 
2. For more on the relationship between the nature of the growth path 
and the distribution of income see John Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo, 
Growth With Equity: The Taiwan Case, Oxford University Press, 1979, as well 
as Gustav Ranis, "Employment and Income Distribution Constraints in Latin 
America," paper to be presented to the International Economic Association, 
Sixth World Congress, Mexico, August 1980. 
3. For a fuller discussion of the real divergence between the "similar" 
cases of Korea and Taiwan, see also "A Model of Growth and Employment in the 
Open Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," Gustav Ranis and John Fei, 
Journal of Development Studies, January 1975, pp. 32-63. (Reprinted in Employ­
ment, Income Distribution and Development, Frances Stewart, editor, Frank Cass 
& Co., London, 1975.) 
4. For an interesting, amusing and highly relevant discussion of the 
Colombian case, also see David Morawetz, "Why the Emperor's New Clothes Are 
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East Asian SIC's - SOUTH KOREA 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 




(5) Gini Coefficient 
(6) Income-% of Bottom 20% 
A . 1 1 Xa /X(7) gricu tura 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 
as % of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 
(X) Growth Rate (%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
2.4 3.2 7.8 8.3 5.6 6.4 11.0 9.0 
(52-60) 
20.3 41.9 41.5 45.3 49.7 50.9 51.5 
(55) (63) 
4.0 8.5 12.0 14.4 10. 8 10.3 14.4 17.9 






82.3 51.4 25.3 16.7 13.2 10.9 15.1 9.3 12.8 
(52) 
11.2 8.3 22.7 8.3 8.5 14.2 7.9 7.8 6.2 
(52) 
6.4 40.3 52.0 74.9 78.1 74.5 76.8 82.6 80.9 
(52) 
10.7 58.6 30.6 55.3 -0.8 7.3 13.6 19.3 
2.1 J.3 8.5 14.3 30.3 28.5 28.5 33.4 35.8 
(52) 
· · Country 
Statistical Indicators 
East Asian SIC's - TAIWAN 
1950 1960 1965 19i0 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 3.2 5.1 ·6.2 9.6 -1.1 0.6 9.8 6.8 
GNP Growth Rate (%) (53...:60) 
(2) G --i. Non-agricultural 37.3 43.9 46.3 55.6 62.8 63.l 63.4 66.9 66.2 
Labor 
(3) Savings/GNP 10.6 17.7 20.1 26.1 33.0 30.3 28.7 30.0 
(51) 
(4) Investment/GNP 12.1 . 19 .1 16.8 21.9 26.1 28.9 30.3 28.4 25.5 
(51) 
(5) Gini Coefficient •32 .32 .29 .29 
(54) (64) (72) 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 2.9 7.8 8.8 
(53) (64) (72) 
(7) Agricultural Xa/X 51. 7 57.9 22.5 15.8 15.5 17.5 13.6 13.4 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 2.1 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.6 
as% of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 46.2 41. 7 76.8 83.9 84.2 81.4 85 .0 84.9 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 9.5 22.2 23.7 31.6 -10.9 1.2 49.6 11.6 
(X) Growth Rate(%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 10.1 11.1 18.4 29.6 49.0 45.4 41.2 52.3 53. 8 
(51) 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 
Gh"P Growth Rate (%) 




(5) Gini Coefficient 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 
X /X{7) Agricultural a 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 
as % of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 
(X) Growth Rate(%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Latin American SIC's - ARGENTINA 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
-0.4 2.8 : 2. 9 3.3 5.1 -2.9 -4.0 3.6 
74.8 · 80 .8 81.8 83.6 85.4 85.8 86.1 
(47) 
20.3 15.5 15. 3 17.9 19.7 20.5 





91.9 95.3 93.6 85.2 77.0 74.8 74.8 74.3 75.5 
0.3 0.7 1.3 2.5 3.9 4.2 1.5 3.1 1.9 
7.6 4.0 5.1 12.3 19.0 21.0 23.6 22.6 22.5 
0.6 3.5 5.9 7.0 1.0 -26.6 61.0 22.6 
14.3 10.6 7.7 8.5 9.7 8.8 7.6 9.4 11.0 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Latin American SIC's - BRAZIL 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 3.2 . 5. 0 9.7 6.7 3.1 6.0 1.9 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 
(2) 9 --% Non-agricultural 39.4 -- 51.2 54.4 58.0 58.8 59.5 
Labor 
(3) Savings/GNP 17.0 18.4 17.4 20.5 20.1 15.2 15 .o 14.9 
(4) Investment/GNP 13.7 18.6 18.6 22.5 23.2 24.4 . 25.7 24.1 22.3 
(5) Gini Coefficient .59 .65 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 3.5 2.8 
(7) Agricultural Xa/X 96.8 88.8 80.8 75.2 70.3 63.9 57.9 61.9 63.9 
Exports (%)as% of (54) 
Total Exports 
(8) Ydneral Exports (%) 2.1 7.9 11.7 14.3 10.0 12.0 16.7 15. 7 12.3 
as % cf Total Exports (54) 
(9) Manufactured Exports 0.8 3.3 7.5· 9.7 17.9 22.3 23.3 20.8 23.0 
(%)as% of Total (54) 
Exports 
-(10) Annual Total Export 9.3-0.4 6.7 9.9 28.0 10.1 0.5 8.9 
(X) Growth Rate(%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 8.3 7.4 7.3 6.6 8.1 8.0 7.5 7.4 7.8 
Cotmtry 
Statistical Indicators 
Latin American SIC's - CHILE 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 1.3 2.5 · 2. 9 -0.6 3.6 -13.0 2.0 6.9 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 
(2) 9 --% Non-agricultural 70.4 72.5 73.1 76.2 79.0 79.5 80.1 
Labor (52) 
(3) Savings/GNP 3.0 -2.5 6.6 6.0 0.8 30.2 -5.9 -1.8 
(4) Investment/GNP 9.1 15·,o 16.1 14.0 13.4 12.6 10.5 9.0 9.2 
(5) Gini Coefficient .51 
(68) 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 4.8 
(68) 
A . 1 1 X /X 7.6(7) gricu tura a 7.5 6.8 8.7 17.3 
Exports (%)as% of (66) 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineoral Exports (%) 88.1 88.3 89.7 87.0 77 .1 
as % of Total Exports (66) 
(9) Manufactured Exports 4.2 4.0 3.5 4.3 5.3 
(66)(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
4.1 5.1 11.4 -6.9 69.6 -38.7 19.9 -0.9(10) Annual Total Export 
(X) Growth Rate (%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 11.1 15.8 12.9 17.1 20.4 21.5 19.6 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Latin American SIC's - COLOMBIA 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 




(5) Gini Coefficient 
(6) Income% of Bottom 20% 
(7) Agricultural Xa/X 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 
as % of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 
(X) Growth Rate(%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 
1950 1960 1965 1970 
4.6 1.4 . 3.1 3.8 
46.1 55.5 62.1 
6.6 9.5 9.1 10.5 
14.2 18.3 15.9 20.9 
.53 • 60 .56 
(62) (64) 
4.1 4.3 3,5 
(62) (64) 
83.1 78.9 75. 3 81.2 
(51) 
16.3 18.9 18.0 10.8 
·IC, '\ 
\.J.J../ 
0.5 1.4 6.7 8.0 
(51) 
-0.5 4.1 3.6 7.4 
10.9 15. 7 11.5 14.6 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
3.2 2.0 
67.8 68.8 69.8 
9.6 11.8 7.4 
17.9 19. 7· 19.2 18.6 18.0 
68.0 63.1 71.7 73.7 76.9 
6.4 9.1 7.7 4.6 4.1 
25.4 27.6 20.6 21.7 18.6 
0.0 -5.3 13.9 31.4 
15.3 14.4 15.4 16.8 16.6 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Latin American SIC's - MEXICO 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 6.2 3.5 . 5. 4 2.5 2.1 1.0 -1.0 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 
(2) 9 --% Non-agricultural 42.2 . 45 .6 49.7 54.8 59.5 60.4 61.3 
Labor 
(3) Savings/GNP 10.0 6.4 7.0 7,2 12.5 11.6 13.1 19.4 
(4) Investment/GNP 11.7 14.8 17.5 19,7 20.5 22.321.3 21.9 20.0 
(5) Gini Coefficient .54 .58 
(63) (69) 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 3.7 4.2 
(63) (69) 
. 1 1 X /X(7) Agricu tura a 53.5 64.1 64.7 48.8 42.6 40.8 38.1 42.1 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 38.6 24.0 22.3 21.2 16.5 23.1 32. 4 30.3
as% of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 7.9 11.9 13.0 30.0 40.8 36.0 29.5 27.5
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 0.9 5.9 1.7 9.3 7.9 -12.0 20.5 24.6 
(X) Growth Rate (%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 17.0 10.6 9.7 8.2 9.4 9.3 7.6 8.5 10.2 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Other Asian LDC's - INDONESIA 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 
3.3 
(53-59) 
.-0.5 1.3 6.0 5.4 2.0 4,0 4,8 
(2) 9 --% Non-agricultural 28.1 29.5 33.7 37.4 38.1 38.8 
Labor (61) 
(3) Savings/GNP 7,9 5,5 9.2 13.8 
(4) Investment/GNP 4.7 7.9 6.7 13.8 18.6 17.6 21.3 21.3 19.5 
(51) 
(5) Gini Coefficient .46 
(71) 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 6.8 
(71) 
(7) A . 1 1 X /Xgricu tura a 65.2 66.4 54.0 54.3 43.4 24.6 20.4 24.9 26.8 
Exports (%)as% of 
Tot.al Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 33.7 33.l 44.l 44.3 54.4 74.5 78.4 73.7 71.5 
as% of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 0.7 0.2 1.9 1.2 1.9 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.6 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export -LO -3.7 6.5 33.4 94.5 -12.5 15 .1 19.7 
(X) Growth Rate (%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 14.3 13.0 20.8 30.4 23. 6 22.8 22,4 
......·:·;..:.. ; ...,,.•:·;..:.. 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Other Asian LDC's - MALAYSIA 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 4.1 . -- 7.5 6.3 -2.0 4.9 6.5 
GNP Growth Rate (%) (55-60) (71-73) 
(2) e --% Non-agricultural 35.5 34.9 40.6 44.5 48.3 49.1 49.9 
Labor 
15.4 14.0 16.8 22.8(3) Savings/GNP 
6.9 12. 8 · 16.8 20.9 23.4 29.8 24.2 22.5 20.5(4) Investment/GNP 
.57 .55 .51(5) Gini Coefficient 
(67) 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 3.2 3,2 3.8 
(67) 
(7) Agricultural Xa/X 74.0 76.4 61. 7 69.6 62.4 57.3 57.6 58.0 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 24.4 19.3 29.3 18.5 24.2 . 24. 9 26.9 26.6 
as% of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 1.6 4,3 8.2 11.3 12.7 17.1 15 .o 15.2 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export -0.3 -3.7 -4,5 7.2 17.4 -23.7 12.8 7,8 
(X) Growth Rate(%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 52.3 56.8 49.0 47,5 43.2 50.5 47,1 53.8 52.2 
(54) 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita 
GNP Growth Rate (%) 




(5) Gini Coefficient 
(6) Income % of Bottom 20% 
X /X
(7) Agricultural a 
Exports (%)as% of 
Total Exports 
(8) Mineral Exports (%) 
as % of Total Exports 
(9) Manufactured Exports 
(%)as% of Total 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 
(X) Growth Rate (%) 
(11) Total Exports/GNP 
Country 
Statistical Indicators 
Other Asian LDC's - PHILIPPINES 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 
3.4 2.2 2.0 3.0 3.2 
(50-59) 
30.5 40.9 42.9 46.8 45.7 
4.2 10. 8 14.2 12.0 17 .6 
12.9 . 13. 7 17.7 16.0 15.4 
.50 .50 .49 
(61) (71) 
4.8 3.7 3.9 
(61) (71) 
88.9 85.6 80.9 69.8 63.4 
(54) 
9.1 11.0 10. 5 23.7 20.9 
(54) 
1. 9 3.4 8.3 6.4 12.0 
(54) 
5.6 10.9 10.5 6.7 2.7 











1975 1976 1977 
5.0 2.9 
50.4 51.1 51.8 
16.3 15. 3 16.8 
24.3 24.8 24.0 
65.1 57.7 58.4 
17.9 18.7 17.0 
11.2 15.3 15.7 
4.2 11.7 
18.6 17.6 19.2 
Country Statistical Indicators 
General Sources 
1) Calculated from indices in UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1978, 
(United Nations Publication Sales No •. E/F.79.XVll.l) pp.698-702. 
Refers to compotmd annual growth of real GNP. 
2) Calculated from population estimates in FA0, Production Yearbooks, 
1966, 1970, and 1977 (Rome, Italy: Statistics Division, FAO) Table 3. 
3) Calculated from World Bank, World Tables, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), and UN National Acconnts Yearbook, 
1978, (United Nations Publication Sales No. E.79.XVII.8,Vol. I). 
4) IMF, Yearbook of International Financial Statistics, (Washington: 
IMF, 1979). Refers to gross investment. 
5) Jain, Shail, Size Distribution of Income, (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1975). All data are for total population. 
6) Ibid. 
7)-9) 1970-77 statistics are from UNCTAD, Yearbook ·of Trade and Develop-
ment Statistics, 1979 (United Nations Publication Sales No. E/F.79.II.D.2). 
Agricultural exports are defined as SITC o+l+2-27-28+4; mineral exports 
are defined as SITC 27+28+3+67+68; and manufactured exports are 
defined as SITC 5+6-67-68+7+8. 
10) Calculated from IMF, Yearbook, ..converted to real values using wholesale 
price indices. 
11) Calculated from IMF, Yearbook. Export values are from the national 
accounts and include goods as well as non-factor services. 
Additional Country Sources 
TAIWAN 
1) Calculated from IMF Yearbook. 
2) Calculated from, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 
(Taipei: Directorate General of Budget, Accourtting and Statistics, 
1978). 
3) National Income of the Republic of China (Taipei: Directorate General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1968 and 1977). 
4) Ibid. 
5) John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, "Growth and the 
Family Distribution of Income by Factor Components, 11 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 92:1 (February 1978), p. 29. 
7) Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1978, 
pp. 252-3. 
SITC o+l+2+4, 
8) Ibid., SITC 3. 
9) Ibid., SITC 5+6+7+8+9. 
PHILIPPINES 
2) Figures for 1973 and 1974 are calculated from ILO, Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics, (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 
1978), p. 223. 
